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Abstract
CVM (communicating virtual machines) is a computational model for concurrent user processes interacting
with a generic microkernel—supporting virtual memory—and devices. In this paper, we introduce the
computational models needed to deﬁne CVM. Furthermore, we describe how CVM can be implemented
by means of a concrete kernel, thus providing a trustworthy platform for microkernel programmers. Last
but not least, we give an overview on the model formalization and implementation correctness proof, which
has been conducted in the interactive theorem prover Isabelle for the most part. An endeavor like this is
tedious and of a considerable complexity. Thus, we do not try to present all details, but provide references
to publications covering speciﬁc aspects.
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1 Introduction
Operating systems are crucial components in nearly every computer system. They
provide plenties of services and functionalities, e.g. managing inter-process commu-
nication, device access, and memory management. Obviously, they play a key role
in the reliability of such systems and in fact, a considerable share of hacker attacks
target operating system vulnerabilities. Thus, proving a computer system to be safe
and secure requires to prove its operating system to be safe and secure.
1 This work was partially funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Technology (BMBF)
in the framework of the Verisoft project under grant 01 IS 07008. The responsibility for this article lies
with the authors.
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At ﬁrst sight, this appears to be a mission impossible because of the sheer size
of operating system implementations. For example, the Linux 2.6.0 kernel released
in late 2003 has nearly 6 million lines of code. Yet, the idea of having a small and
reliable kernel is not new and has led to the development of so-called 2nd generation
microkernels like L4 [16]. Microkernels oﬀer elementary, but suﬃcient functionality,
and can therefore be of relatively small size. For instance by using them as a trusted
platform, we can run two operating systems on top of it, one small and reliable for
critical applications, and a conventional one for all other tasks [24].
In this paper, we describe how a whole framework, featuring virtual memory
support, memory management, system calls, user deﬁned interrupts, etc.—thus
providing a trustworthy platform for microkernel programmers—can be proven cor-
rect. We introduce a computational model called CVM (communicating virtual
machines), that formalizes concurrent user processes interacting with a generic
(abstract) microkernel and devices. To establish interaction, the abstract kernel
features special functions called CVM primitives, which are invoked by the user
processes and alter process or device conﬁgurations, e.g. by copying data from one
process to another. By linking a CVM implementation to an abstract kernel, we
obtain a concrete kernel (‘personality’).
For each layer in the computer system—hardware, devices, user processes, and
abstract kernel—we deﬁne a formal model. Implementation correctness is deﬁned
by several simulation relations between these layers. The proofs are conducted in
the interactive theorem prover Isabelle/HOL [22] and have already been completed
to a large extent.
CVM is used in the Verisoft project [29] in two personalities: (i) VAMOS is a
microkernel used in an academic stack, where on top of it a simple operating system
(SOS) is running, and (ii) OLOS, an OSEKtime-like operating system, is used in a
distributed automotive real-time system establishing eCall functionality [13].
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Sect 2 we list some
related work. Sect. 3 introduces some notation needed in Sect. 4 to deﬁne our
models formally. We present a generic framework for devices in Sect. 4.1. In partic-
ular, we show how physical machines and external devices can be coupled formally
(Sect. 4.2). User processes are modeled by assembler machines running on virtual
memory (Sect. 4.3), while computations of the abstract kernel are deﬁned by C0
semantics (Sect. 4.4). In Sect. 5 we sketch the construction of the concrete kernel
containing the CVM implementation. The simulation relations that establish CVM
implementation correctness are described in Sect. 6. The status quo of the formal
veriﬁcation is presented in detail in Sect. 7. We conclude in Sect. 8.
2 Related Work
First attempts to use theorem provers to specify and even prove correct operating
systems were made as early as the seventies in PSOS [20] and UCLA Secure Unix
[32]. However a missing—or to a large extend underdeveloped—tool environment
made mechanized veriﬁcation futile. With the CLI stack [4], a new pioneering ap-
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proach for pervasive system veriﬁcation was undertaken. Most notably, the simple
kernel KIT was developed and its machine code implementation was proven to be
correct. Compared to modern kernels KIT was very limited, in particular, it lacked
interaction with devices. The project L4.veriﬁed [9] focuses on the veriﬁcation of an
eﬃcient microkernel, rather than on formal pervasiveness, as no compiler correct-
ness or accurate device interaction is considered. The microkernel is implemented in
a larger subset of C, including pointer arithmetic and an explicit low-level memory
model [31]. However with inline assembler code we gain an even more expressive
semantics as machine registers become visible if necessary. So far, only exemplary
portions of kernel code were reported to be veriﬁed, the virtual memory subsystem
uses no demand paging [30]. For code veriﬁcation L4.veriﬁed relies on the Verisoft’s
Hoare environment [26]. In the FLINT project, an assembly code veriﬁcation frame-
work is developed and code for context switching on a x86 architecture was formally
proven [21]. Although a veriﬁcation logic for assembler code is presented, no integra-
tion of results into high-level programming languages is undertaken. The VFiasco
project [12] aims at the veriﬁcation of the microkernel Fiasco implemented in a
subset of C++. Code veriﬁcation is performed in a embedding of C++ in PVS and
there is no attempt to map the results down to the machine level.
3 Notation
We use f : A ⇀ B to denote a partial mapping f from sets A to B, while g : A→ B
stands for a total mapping. We denote the concatenation of bit strings a ∈ {0, 1}n
and b ∈ {0, 1}n by a ◦ b. For bits x ∈ {0, 1} and positive natural numbers n ∈ N+,
we deﬁne inductively x1 = x and xn = xn−1 ◦ x, e.g. 05 = 00000 and 12 = 11. For
x ∈ {0, 1}n, x[i], 0 ≤ i < n denotes the bit at position i of the bit string. Ni with
i ∈ N+ denotes the natural interval [0, i − 1]. For ﬁnite sequences seq : N ⇀ T ,
we use shorthand notation seq = hd; tl where hd denotes the head of the sequence,
i.e. the element seq[0], and tl the remaining elements.
4 Computational Models
We have developed a generalized framework to model diﬀerent devices in a uniform
way (Sec. 4.1). Physical machines (Sec. 4.2) are used to specify the underlying
microprocessor hardware. User process computations are modeled by assembler se-
mantics (Sec. 4.3), abstract kernel computations by C0 semantics (Sec. 4.4). Finally,
we combine the above computational models to specify CVM (Sect. 4.5).
4.1 Devices
We use devices in two ways in CVM. First, the page fault handler described in
Sect. 5.3 uses a hard disk as swap device. Second, we oﬀer a range of typical
devices accessible by user processes through special kernel calls. Currently, we
support models for ﬁve diﬀerent device types: (i) a hard disk, e.g. used as the swap
device for memory virtualization [11], (ii) a timer, which can be used for scheduling
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user processes, (iii) a network interface, (iv) an UART serial interface, which can be
used to set up a terminal [1], and (v) an automotive bus controller, which is used in
Verisoft’s Automotive subproject [14,13]. Device communication happens on many
diﬀerent layers throughout our stack. Nevertheless, in order to establish a uniform
way of interacting with devices, we have developed a generic device framework
featuring standardized transition functions for all layers.
For each device type, we deﬁne a speciﬁc device conﬁguration, e.g. chd for
hard disks. The set of all speciﬁc device conﬁgurations (including a generic error
state ⊥) is denoted by Conf sdevs. Furthermore, we deﬁne the set of device IDs by
DID = N+dmax+1, whereas dmax is ﬁxed and determines the maximal number of
devices. Formally, the generalized device conﬁguration is deﬁned by the mapping
Conf devs : DID → Conf sdevs.
Devices are memory-mapped and can communicate in two directions, namely
with the processor and with the environment (e.g. with a user or a screen). Thus, we
deﬁne two transition functions, one for internal and one for external communication.
The generalized internal transition function is parameterized over inputs from the
processor (Miﬁ). One element of the processor input is deﬁned by a tuple miﬁ =
(id, rd, wr, ad, count, data), whereas (i) id ∈ DID denotes the device ID, (ii) rd ∈
{0, 1} denotes the read ﬂag, (iii) wr ∈ {0, 1} denotes the write ﬂag, (iv) ad gives the
device port where to read from or where to write to, and (v) data ﬁnally speciﬁes
the data to be written if wr = 1.
Furthermore, internal steps do not only yield a successor device conﬁguration,
but also output to the processor (Mifo ⊆ N) and, potentially, to the environment,
which is speciﬁc for each device type: Eifo = {Eifohd,Eifoabc, . . .}. Now we can
formally deﬁne the generalized internal transition function δdint : Conf devs×Miﬁ →
Conf devs ×Mifo × Eifo.
Input from the environment is also device type speciﬁc; We specify the gen-
eralized set of environment input by Eiﬁ = {Eiﬁhd,Eiﬁabc, . . .}. Again, de-
vices may generate output. The external transition function is given by δdext :
Conf devs ×DID × Eiﬁ → Conf devs × Eifo.
Of course this way of dealing with devices is not the only possible on; modern
architectures mostly rely on devices with direct-memory access (DMA). Yet, this
makes modeling much more diﬃcult and would require considerable changes on the
hardware implementation. First, either the processor would not be the sole bus
master any longer, but I/O MMUs would have to guard the bus, or one would have
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to trust devices not to access sensitive data; second, DMA regions would have to
be excluded from caching. Since these regions are set up dynamically, this would
require hardware support for explicit cache ﬂushing.
4.2 Physical machines and instruction set architecture
The lowest layer in our stack is given by the architecture of the underlying VAMP
microprocessor [6]. The VAMP provides a single-level address translation mecha-
nism [8,10] and supports memory-mapped devices [1,11].
In order to realize memory virtualization, the VAMP runs in two modes: user
mode and system mode. In user mode, all addresses are virtual and have to be
translated ﬁrst before accessing memory [7]. However, in system mode, we deal
with physical addresses that can be used without translation. In our scenario, the
microkernel runs in system mode while the user processes run in user mode.
The processor and the devices may either progress individually or communicate
with each other. Communication is established either by the processor executing a
memory operation to a special memory region assigned to devices (see Fig. 3) or by
the device causing an external interrupt.
Physical machines are the hardware model for a system programmer. Due to
space limitations, we will only introduce the relevant parts here.
A physical machine conﬁguration cphys comprises the registers, the program
counters, and the memory content. The register ﬁle is split into two parts: (i) gpr :
{0, 1}5 → {0, 1}32, the general purpose register ﬁle, and (ii) spr : {0, 1}5 ⇀ {0, 1}32,
the special purpose register ﬁle. For shorthand notation, we use symbolic names
for special purpose registers, e.g. Edata for spr(00101). In order to implement
the delayed branch mechanism as described in [17], we specify a program counter
pc ∈ {0, 1}32 and a delayed program counter dpc ∈ {0, 1}32. Finally, there is a
word-addressed physical memory pm : {0, 1}30 ⇀ {0, 1}32. We formally denote a
physical machine conﬁguration by the tuple cphys = (gpr, spr, pcp, dpc, pm).
An instruction set architecture (ISA) is given by a transition function δphys,
that maps a conﬁguration cphys and external event signals eev ∈ {0, 1}dmax to a
next conﬁguration c′phys = δphys(cphys, eev). Due to space limitations, we will not
give a full formal deﬁnition of the ISA transition function, but only an idea of it.
The transition function depends on the special purpose register mode, where
mode = 0 denotes system mode and mode = 1 denotes user mode. For system
mode, the transition function is simply deﬁned by the instruction to which cphys.dpc
points (see [5,17]). In user mode, memory accesses are subject to address transla-
tion: they either cause a page fault or are redirected to the translated physical
address pma(cphys, va) for a given virtual address va. For details on VAMP address
translation see [8].
In order to deﬁne δphys(cphys, eev) more formally, we need some helper func-
tions: (i) I(cphys) = cphys.pm(cphys.dpc) denotes the instruction to be executed in
conﬁguration cphys, (ii) predicates ?lw(cphys) and ?sw(cphys) distinguish I(cphys)
being a ’load word’ or a ’store word’ instruction, (iii) RS1(cphys), RS2(cphys),
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and RD(cphys) are returning the general purpose register operands of I(cphys),
(iv) imm(cphys) returns the immediate constant of I(cphys), and (v) ea(cphys) =
cphys.gpr(RS1(cphys))+ imm(cphys) speciﬁes the eﬀective address of I(cphys), i.e. its
memory operand.
Note, that for CVM, only the kernel running in system mode interacts directly
with devices, thus address translation does not aﬀect. Devices are memory mapped,
i.e. a part of the memory is shared by both the processor and the devices (cf. Fig. 3).
We denote the set of addresses in this part of the memory by DIO . Let the pred-
icate ?int(i) denote, if the device with ID i is in an interrupt state. We can now
deﬁne the external event signals as eev =?int(dmax)◦?int(dmax− 1) ◦ . . . ◦?int(1).
Let us introduce an input alphabet I = (DID × Eiﬁ) ∪ {0} and an output al-
phabet O = Eifo ∪ {ε}. Formally the combined transition function of physical
machines and devices δp&d(cphys, cdevs, in) = (c′phys, c
′
devs, out) is deﬁned for in ∈ I
and out ∈ O as follows. For external device input (in 	= 0), we execute the exter-
nal device transition function, thus c′phys = cphys and (c
′
devs, out) = δdext(cdevs, in).
For processor steps (in = 0), we distinguish between steps with device inter-
action, i.e. ea(cphys) ∈ DIO , and without device interaction: (i) in the former
case, we execute both the processor and the internal device transition function:
c′phys = δphys(cphys, eev) and (c
′
devs,mifo, out) = δdint(cdevs,miﬁ). If ?lw(cphys), we
set c′phys.gpr(RD(cphys)) = mifo, otherwise we discard mifo. (ii) In the latter case,
we execute the transition function of the processor: c′phys = δphys(cphys, eev) and
(c′devs, out) = (cdevs, ε). Here, miﬁ is obtained by a helper function dec(ea(cphys)) =
(i, ad) returning the device id i and port ad for a given eﬀective address, such that
miﬁ = (i, ad, ?lw(cphys), ?sw(cphys), cphys.gpr(RD(cphys))).
The n-step transition function δnp&d takes initial conﬁgurations cphys and cdevs,
and a input sequence ins of length m, with elements mi ∈ I and m ≥ n. While exe-
cuting single steps, δnp&d generates an output sequence outs of length m and elements
in O. We deﬁne δnp&d recursively: (i) δ
0
p&d(cphys, cdevs, ins) = (cphys, cdevs, ε), and
(ii) δi+1p&d(cphys, cdevs, ins) = δp&d(c
′
phys, c
′
devs, ins(i+1)) with δ
i
p&d(cphys, cdevs, ins) =
(c′phys, c
′
devs, outs)
4.3 Assembler Semantics
User processes are applications running on top of the microkernel. Given that we
also want to consider malevolent (hacker) applications, we restrain from any pro-
gramming restrictions imposed by C and model all processes as assembler machines.
More precisely, since the microkernel is providing memory virtualization and these
applications run on a uniform virtual memory, we will use virtual assembler ma-
chines. A virtual machine conﬁguration cASM is closely related to the physical
machine conﬁguration describing the hardware. It still comprises the register ﬁles
and the program counters. We consider register numbers as naturals and their
contents as integers. Furthermore, only a subset of the special purpose registers
available in the real hardware is visible here and the instruction set is limited.
We formally deﬁne the register ﬁles (similar to Sect. 4.2) as (partial) mappings,
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i.e. gpr : N32 → Z and spr : N32 ⇀ Z, and the two program counters dpc, pcp ∈ N.
The memory is given by mm : N ⇀ Z, such that the overall assembler conﬁguration
is speciﬁed by the tuple cASM = (gpr, spr, pcp, dpc,mm).
The transition function, which maps a given assembler conﬁguration cASM either
to its successor conﬁguration or to an error state ⊥: δASM : Conf ASM → Conf ASM∪
{⊥}, is deﬁned over the current instruction to which (dpc.mm(c.dpc)) points. For
example, the error state can be reached if the user process tries to access a restricted
special purpose register.
Let δnASM : Conf ASM → Conf ASM ∪ {⊥} denote the function that applies the
transition function n ∈ N times. We deﬁne inductively (i) δ0ASM(cASM) = cASM and
(ii) δi+1ASM(cASM) = δASM(c
′
ASM) if δ
i
ASM(cASM) = c
′
ASM and c
′
ASM 	= ⊥, else ⊥.
4.4 C0 Small Step Semantics
C0 is the C-like imperative programming language developed and widely used in
Verisoft. It features suﬃcient functionality to implement system software and ap-
plications, yet having a concise formal semantics which allows for the—more or
less—eﬃcient veriﬁcation of code with several thousands lines, e.g. a non-optimizing
compiler and a simple email client [23,3].
A C0 program is identiﬁed by its functions—including information about their
list of parameters and local variables—, the type name environment and the list
of global variables. C0 supports four elementary types (Bool, Integer, Unsigned
and Char) and allows for non-elementary, recursive data types: Arr(l, t) denotes
the array with l elements of type t and, for types ti and component names ni,
Struct([(n0, t0), . . . , (nl, tl−1)]) denotes a structure type with l components. C0
pointers are denoted by Ptr(tn) where tn stands for a type name deﬁned in the
type name environment tenv, a mapping tenv : Σ+ ⇀ ty mapping type names
to types. The procedure table contains the information about all functions of a
C0 program. Formally, it is a partial mapping ptable : Σ+ ⇀ fdesc of function
names to their corresponding descriptors, containing information on function body,
parameters, local variables and return type. The global variables are deﬁned by a
sequence of variable names and their associated types: st : N ⇀ Σ+ × ty, called
symbol table. We will not discuss in detail C0 statements (Stmt) and expressions
(Expr). The deﬁnitions of both are straightforward and are presented exhaustively
in [15].
A C0 conﬁguration cC0 = (mem, pr) consists of the memory conﬁguration
mem—storing information about the (possibly dynamically allocated) program vari-
ables and their values—and the program rest pr. Variables are represented in a gen-
eralized way as so-called g-vars, deﬁned inductively as: a global variable of name x
as gvargm(x), a local variable of name x in the i-th stack frame as gvarlm(i, x), and
a nameless heap variable with index i as gvarhm(i). If s is a g-var of structural type,
then its component with name cn is also a g-var: gvar(s, cn). Similar, for a g-var a
of array type, its i-th element is also a g-var: gvar(a, i). A memory conﬁguration
is given by a triple consisting of (i) a global memory frame mem.gm : mframe,
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(ii) a local memory stack mem.lm : N ⇀ mframe × gvar 2 , and (iii) a heap mem-
ory frame mem.hm : mframe. Each frame contains a symbol table and a content
ct : N ⇀ mcell , mapping addresses to typed memory cells. Memory cells can store
the value of an elementary type variable, whereas pointers are represented by a g-var
or the null pointer value Null ; values of aggregate variables are stored in consecutive
memory cells. The second component of a C0 conﬁguration is the program rest, a
sequence of statements still to be executed: pr = s1, . . . , sn with si ∈ Stmt .
Given a type name environment te and a procedure table pt, the transition
function maps the current C0 conﬁguration either to its successor conﬁguration or
to an error state ⊥: δC0 : tenv × ptable×Conf C0 → Conf C0 ∪ {⊥}. δC0 is deﬁned
inductively over the program rest (see [15] for a detailed deﬁnition).
We deﬁne δnC0 , which executes the transition function n times, by induction on n:
(i) δ0C0 (te, pt, cC0 ) = cC0 (ii) δ
i+1
C0 (te, pt, cC0 ) = δC0 (te, pt, c
′
C0 ), if δ
i
C0 (te, pt, cC0 ) =
c′C0 and c
′
C0 	= ⊥, else ⊥.
4.5 CVM Semantics
Communicating virtual machines (CVM) are a computational model for a ﬁxed
number of processes. The processes can interact with each other and with a ﬁxed
number of devices, whereas all communication is handled by a generic abstract mi-
crokernel oﬀering various speciﬁc kernel calls (CVM primitives). So far, there is no
support for shared memory, neither between devices and processes nor between pro-
cesses themselves. We use assembler semantics as introduced in Sect. 4.3 to model
user process computations and the C0 semantics from Sect. 4.4 for the computa-
tions of the abstract kernel. Device behavior is deﬁned by the semantics described
in Sect. 4.1.
A CVM conﬁguration cCVM = (kernel, proc, devs, sr, cup) comprises the follow-
ing ﬁve components: (i) Let PID = N+pmax+1 denote the set of user process IDs
with a ﬁxed pmax. Then, a user processes conﬁguration procs is formally a map-
ping of process IDs to assembler conﬁgurations: procs : PID → Conf ASM . (ii) The
kernel part is speciﬁed by a type name environment, a procedure table, and a C0
conﬁguration: kernel = (tenv, pt, conf ). (iii) The device conﬁguration is given by
a generalized device conﬁguration devs. (iv) cup ∈ PID ∪ {0} speciﬁes the current
process ID or, in case of cup = 0, the kernel. (v) sr ∈ {0, 1}dmax−1, the interrupt
mask for the devices. If sr[i] = 0, then interrupts of the device with ID did = i+ 2
are masked 3 .
In each CVM step, either the kernel, or one user process, or one device pro-
gresses. One step in a CVM computation is deﬁned by the transition function
δCVM : Conf CVM × I → (Conf CVM ∪ {⊥}) × O, where ⊥ denotes the error state.
In the following deﬁnitions, we only mention components that are changing in one
step of the computation.
2 local memory frames have an additional g-var deﬁning the memory location where the function return
value is to be stored
3 Note, that the hard disk used for swapping (device ID didshd = 1) is not visible in the CVM speciﬁcation.
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Fig. 2. CVM Control Flow
Given a CVM conﬁguration cCVM and a parameter in: if in 	= 0, we execute the
external transition function of the device part of the CVM conﬁguration cCVM.devs
as described in Sect. 4.1: δdext(cCVM.devs, in) = (c′CVM.devs, out).
For in = 0, execution depends on the value of cCVM.cup: if cCVM.cup = i > 0,
the user process cCVM.procs(i) makes a step, otherwise the kernel progresses.
Let the predicate JISR(cASM, cdevs) ∈ {0, 1} denote, that an interrupt occurred
in the current user process conﬁguration cASM and device conﬁguration cdevs w.r.t.
the interrupt mask cCVM.sr. Then we compute the (masked) exception cause
mca(cASM) ∈ N and a potential parameter edata(cASM) ∈ N (e.g. in case of a
trap exception). Details on JISR, mca, and edata can be found in [8,17]. For
¬JISR(cCVM.procs(cCVM.cup), cCVM.devs), we execute the transition function δASM
as described in Sect. 4.3: c′CVM.procs(cCVM.cup) = δASM(cCVM.procs(cCVM.cup)).
Otherwise, a visible interrupt has occurred and kernel execution starts at the
entry point given by the C0 function kdispatch with parameters mca and
edata. We set cCVM.cup = 0 and the kernel’s program rest to the function call
c′CVM.kernel .conf .pr = SCall(kret, kdispatch,mca(cASM), edata(cASM)) where kret
denotes the return variable and SCall is the C0 function call statement.
After booting and after an interrupt, kernel execution starts by calling the func-
tion kdispatch. Note, that while the kernel runs, interrupts are disabled, i.e. our ker-
nel is non-interruptible (’non-preemptive’). If cCVM.cup = 0 and the kernel program
rest does not start with a function call to a CVM primitive , we simply execute the
C0 transition function as described in Sect. 4.4: c′CVM.kernel = δC0 (cCVM.kernel).
Otherwise, we have cCVM.kernel .conf .pr = ESCall(v , prim, expr1 , . . . , exprn); r for
a CVM primitive prim, an integer return variable v and unsigned expressions
expr1 , . . . , exprn ∈ Expr . Here, ESCall is the C0 statement for external func-
tion calls, i.e. functions with declarations but without a body (Sect. 5 explains
how to get a fully implemented kernel). Each primitive prim is speciﬁed by
a function primS , which takes n natural arguments and a CVM conﬁguration
cCVM, returning an updated CVM conﬁguration c′CVM or the error state ⊥. Let
evalr be the evaluation function for righthand side C0 expressions as deﬁned in
[15]. Then, we compute for 1 ≤ i ≤ n: vali = evalr(cCVM.kernel, ei) and set
(c′CVM) = primS(cCVM, val1, . . . , valn).
For example, CVM provides primitives (i) Reset and Clone for process initial-
ization, (ii) Alloc and Free for increasing and decreasing memory of an user process,
(iii) Copy to copy data from one process to another, (iv) GetGPR and SetGPR to
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read and write registers of user processes, (v) GetWord and SetWord to read from
and write to a user process memory address, (vi) InWord and OutWord for device
communication, and (vii) SetMask for setting the CVM interrupt mask. For a full
list of primitives see [27].
Due to lack of space, we exemplify by the speciﬁcation of SetGPR: Given a con-
ﬁguration with kernel program rest ESCall(v,SetGPR, expr1 , expr2 , . . . , expr5 ); r.
We set SetGPRS(cCVM, pid, i, y) = c′CVM with (i) c
′
CVM.proc(pid).gpr(i) =
y, (ii) c′CVM.kernel .conf .pr = r, and (iii) c
′
CVM.kernel .conf .mem =
mem update(cCVM.kernel .conf .mem, v , 0 ) with the C0 memory update function
as deﬁned in [15].
Note, that since the whole stack runs on one single processor, it is legal to assume
that either the kernel or an user process perform a step. This is not that obvious
for the devices. Remember that devices are memory-mapped and access to these
memory regions happens only within the dedicated primitives of the kernel. These
primitives are written in assembler, hence steps in the kernel and on the physical
machine have the same granularity: one instruction. Additionally, the actual syn-
chronization with the device can be mapped down to one single instruction, namely
a load word or store word instruction. All other steps during kernel execution are
independent from the device computation. This means, all interleavings possible
between physical machine steps and devices—as seen in Sect. 4.2—are also possible
on between the kernel and the devices.
5 CVM Implementation
In this section, we will give an overview on the CVM implementation details and
how to merge such an implementation with the abstract kernel in order to obtain a
compilable and thus executable kernel.
5.1 Data Structures
To simulate virtual machines and multi-processing, the CVM implementation has to
maintain certain data structures: (i) in the kernel global memory (kernel data), we
store an array of process control blocks pcb[i], i ∈ PID for all user processes. One
process control block has components pcb[i].r for each register and the program
counters of cphys, (ii) the global memory variable cup keeps track of the current user
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process as speciﬁed in cCVM.cup and similarly, sr for cCVM.sr, (iii) in the global
memory variable kheap, we store the end address of the kernel heap, (iv) the array
ptspace on the kernel heap holds the page tables of all user processes, and (v) data
structures of the page-fault handler (see Sect.5.3) necessary for the management of
physical and swap memory.
5.2 Entering and Leaving System Mode
Whenever we enter system mode, i.e. the kernel starts to execute, we initialize its
program rest with cCVM.kernel .conf .prog = init . In all cases but reset, init will
take the current process and store its registers into the corresponding control block
pcb[cup]. Then, the kernel is initialized and the CVM dispatcher cvmdispatch is
called with parameters pcb[cup].eca, pcb[cup].edata, and pcb[cup].edpc. As men-
tioned in Sect.4.5, interrupts are to be invisible in system mode. We achieve this by
zeroing the status register cphys.SR. In case of a page fault, the page fault handler
is invoked by cvmdispatch. Otherwise we continue with a call to the abstract kernel
dispatcher kdispatch with parameters pcb[cup].eca and pcb[cup].edata.
To leave system mode and with i ∈ PID being the user process to be started, we
set cup = i and restore the process from its control block pcb[i]. Finally, we leave
kernel execution with a return from exception instruction (rfe).
Note, that a scheduler is not part of the concrete kernel, i.e. the abstract kernel
has to take care of handling timer interrupts. Thus, we are not giving any guarantees
5.3 Page Fault Handler
For pcb[cup].eca = 8, the user process with ID cup has caused a page fault on
fetch interrupt (pﬀ ), i.e. the process’ delayed pc points to an address not present in
physical memory. Thus, the page fault handler is called with parameters cup and
pcb[cup].edpc. For pcb[cup].eca = 16, we are dealing with a page fault on load/store
(pﬂs), i.e. a memory operation was accessing an address not present in physical
memory. In this case, cvmdispatch invokes the page fault handler with parameters
cup and pcb[cup].edata. For details on the paging algorithm used in Verisoft see [2].
5.4 CVM Primitives
The implementation of the various primitives is straightforward. Some of them
are only updating the process control blocks of tasks and are therefore imple-
mented in pure C0 . Other primitives—e.g. those copying memory from one process
to another—are manipulating data structures not visible in C0 . In these cases,
hardware-speciﬁc assembler code portions are inevitable. We inline them directly
into the C0 code with a special ASM statement.
5.5 Abstract Linker and Concrete Kernel
As we have seen in the sections before, it takes several things to build a concrete
kernel from an abstract one. We have to provide implementations for these func-
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Fig. 4. Simulation Relations During User and Kernel Execution
tions, the abstract kernel only declares (i.e. the CVM primitives), and we have to
add functions that are not visible in the abstract kernel (i.e. cvmdispatch). Ad-
ditionally, we have to add some extra global variables not needed in the abstract
kernel.
Starting with two programs A = (teA, ptA, gstA) and B = (teB, ptB, gstB), we
build the linked program link(A,B) = (teld, ptld, gst ld) as follows: (i) We merge
the two type name environments by simply adding one to the other. (ii) For any
external procedure p in ptA, i.e. with an empty body, we look for a corresponding
procedure in ptB with implementation and remove p from ptA if one exists. Vice
versa, we repeat this for procedures q in ptB. ptld is then given by the disjoint union
of the procedure tables updated as described afore. (iii) We build the new global
symbol table by appending gstB to gstA: gst ld = gstA; gstB. (iv) Finally, we scan
all procedure bodies of ptld for external function calls denoted by the C0 statement
ESCall . For any of these statements we check, if it is now implemented after linking.
If so, we replace the ESCall statement by a SCall statement. Linking does obviously
not work for two arbitrary programs. Due to space limitations, we have omitted
any preconditions here, e.g. the two symbol tables having to be disjoint.
We can now build a compilable concrete kernel by linking the CVM implemen-
tation cvm to the abstract kernel implementation ak: ck = link(cvm, ak).
6 CVM Implementation Correctness
6.1 User Process Relations
The implementation correctness of the CVM speciﬁcation user process part cCVM.up
is deﬁned by three separate relations. ∼cup relates the current user process cCVM.cup
to the value stored at the appropriate address in cphys. ∼sr relates the status register
cCVM.sr to the value stored at the appropriate address in cphys. Last but not least,
∼procs deﬁnes the way, the user process conﬁgurations cCVM.procs(i) are to be stored
in cphys.
A physical machine with appropriate page fault handlers can simulate virtual
machines. In Verisoft, we consider a simple pager that stores virtual memory in
the swap memory, whereas the physical memory acts as a write back cache. The
swap memory is provided by a designated hard disk with device ID didshd = 1.
For simplicity, we omit here the full hard disk model and consider only its content,
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a mapping of addresses to content: sm : N ⇀ Z. Besides the architecturally de-
ﬁned physical memory address pma(cphys, va), we deﬁne a (software) swap memory
address function sma(cphys, va) maintained by the page fault handler, which maps
virtual addresses to addresses in cdevs(1).sm.
Let ?valid(cphys, p, va) be a predicate denoting if a virtual address va for a
process p lies in physical memory or not. Then we deﬁne a function get mm,
constructing the virtual memory of a process p from a physical machine conﬁgu-
ration cphys as follows: (i) for ?valid(cphys, p, ad), we set get mm(cphys, p)(ad) =
cphys.mm(pma(cphys, ad)) and (ii) (cdevs(1)).sm(sma(cphys, ad)) else. Furthermore,
we deﬁne a function get gpr constructing the general purpose register ﬁle for a
process p and a conﬁguration cphys: (i) if cup = p ∧ cphys.mode = 1, we set
get gpr(cphys, p)(reg) = cphys.gpr(reg), and (ii) pcp[p].reg , else, for reg ∈ N32.
Correspondingly, we deﬁne functions get dpc, get pcp, get spr , and the function
get vm(cphys, p) that combines the functions afore and returns a whole conﬁgura-
tion.
The physical machine simulates a user process i ∈ PID , iﬀ get vm(cphys, i) =
cCVM.procs(i). We deﬁne ∼procs as the conjunction of this equality relation over all
processes: ∼procs (cCVM.procs, cphys) =
∧pmax
i=1 get vm(cphys, i) = cCVM.procs(i).
6.2 Kernel Relations
First, the abstract kernel has to be simulated by the concrete kernel. Second, the
concrete kernel is a C0 program and cannot be executed directly on the hardware.
Thus, we depend on compiler correctness, i.e. a simulation relation between C0
machines and physical machines.
6.2.1 Abstract Kernel and Concrete Kernel
We deﬁne a simulation relation ∼kern that tells us when a concrete kernel conﬁgura-
tion cc encodes an abstract kernel conﬁguration ca. As seen in Sect. 5, the concrete
kernel has more variables and more function calls than the abstract one. Thus we
deﬁne a mapping of abstract kernel variables gvarca to concrete kernel variables
gvarcc as kalloc(g, hpm) := (i) gvarccgm(v) for g = gvar
ca
gm(v), (ii) gvar
cc
lm(i + j, v)
for g = gvarcalm(i, x), and (iii) gvar
cc
hm(hpm(i)) if g = gvar
ca
hm(i). Note, that the
constant j denotes the number of extra function calls in the concrete kernel and
hpm : N ⇀ N is a mapping of heap indices in the abstract kernel to heap indices in
the concrete kernel.
Now, we set ∼kern (ca, cc, teca, ptca, tecc, ptcc, kalloc) iﬀ (i) corresponding vari-
ables gca and gcc = kalloc(gca, hpm) have the same values and types, (ii) the re-
cursion depths are equal modulo the constant number j of extra function calls in
cc, (iii) the program rest of the abstract kernel ca.pr is a preﬁx of the concrete
kernel program rest cc.pr, (iv) the abstract type name environment teca is a subset
of the concrete one tecc, and (v) all procedures declared or deﬁned in the abstract
procedure table ptca are also deﬁned in the concrete ptcc.
During user execution, the local memory stacks of both the abstract kernel and
the concrete kernel are empty, as is the program rest of both kernels. This means,
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that ∼kern would be unprovable. Thus, we deﬁne a weaker form ∼∗kern, which omits
any properties on local variables, the recursion depth, and the program rest.
6.2.2 Compiler Correctness
The concrete kernel is written in C0 with inline assembler portions, while on the
actual hardware, the translated object-code is executed. Hence, we have to deﬁne
in a formal way, what correct translation of C0 means. Since our work is part of
the Verisoft project, we are using the Verisoft simple non-optimizing C0 Compiler
and the consistency relation it provides. Nevertheless, approaches like translation
validation [25] are also feasible and have been successfully applied in other projects
[19].
Compiler correctness is deﬁned by means of a simulation relation
consis(te, pt, cC0, alloc, cASM) between conﬁgurations cC0 of C0 machines and con-
ﬁgurations cphys of physical machines, which run the compiled code. Additionally,
consis is parameterized with an allocation function alloc (a mapping of g-vars to
memory addresses), a type name environment te, and a procedure table pt. A com-
plete formal deﬁnition of consis with a correctness proof for a simple, non-optimizing
compiler, can be found in [15].
Essentially, consis divides into three sub-relations:
(i) consiscode(te, pt, cC0, cphys), code consistency, requires that the compiled code
is stored at a well-deﬁned address in the machine conﬁguration,
(ii) consisc(te, pt, cC0, cphys), control consistency, requires that the program coun-
ters of the physical machine point to the start address of the code which has
been generated for the head of the program rest, and
(iii) consisd(te, pt, cC0, alloc, cphys), data consistency. Data consistency states that
g-vars are correctly stored in the physical machine and that some auxiliary
information about stack and heap are stored correctly.
Like with ∼kern, consis is too strong during user execution, Since the values
stored in the registers of the physical machine are those of the current user process,
some sub-relations do not hold or have to be modiﬁed at least: (i) Control con-
sistency is discarded, because the program counters are related to the current user
process. Since we always enter the kernel at the same entry point (cf. Sect. 4.5),
we do not even store the old values when leaving system mode. (ii) During kernel
execution, the relation between the size of the heap in the C0 conﬁguration and
the one in the physical machine is deﬁned by a designated general purpose register.
Throughout user execution, we use the kernel variable kheap instead. We denote
this—weaker—simulation relation by consis∗.
6.3 Device Relation
Since we are using a generalized device framework as introduced in Sect. 4.1, the
devices as seen by the CVM model are nearly the same as those on the physical
machine level, only the hard disk used as swap device (didshd = 1) is not visible in
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CVM. Hence, ∼dev is merely an equivalence relation between the states of the CVM
devices and those of the physical machine devices: ∼devs:
∧dmax
2 cCVM.devs(i) =
cdevs(i)
6.4 Correctness Theorem and Proof
We introduce one single simulation relation ∼CVM (cCVM, cphys, cdevs), for which we
demand, that (i) the relations ∼sr and ∼procs—and in the case of user mode ∼cup—
hold, (ii) there exists a concrete kernel conﬁguration cc, such that ∼kern (and ∼∗kern
respectively) and consis (and consis∗ respectively) hold. Furthermore, we denote
initial conﬁgurations, i.e. the conﬁgurations after a reset, by a superscript 0.
Deﬁnition 6.1 [CVM Correctness] For all initial conﬁgurations c0phys, c
0
devs, c
0
CVM,
and input sequences insp&d and for all steps i, there exists a function f , such
that ciCVM = δ
i
CVM(c
0
CVM, f(insp&d)), and steps t, such that (c
t
phys, c
t
devs) =
δp&d(c0phys, c
0
devs, insp&d) with ∼CVM (ciCVM, ctphys, ctdevs).
This correctness statement is proven by induction. The induction base case
(i = 0) is deﬁned by a CVM conﬁguration c0CVM, whereas the kernel is running
(cvm.cup = 0) and its program rest starts with kdispatch with parameter eca = 1
(for reset).
7 Status of the Formal Veriﬁcation
The induction base case is already completely proven in Isabelle. For the induction
step, we distinguish between user steps, abstract kernel steps, primitive steps and
context switching. We have already obtained essential results by the formal veriﬁ-
cation of a paging mechanism [2], which represents the main diﬃculty for user steps.
To prove ∼CVM for user steps by integrating these results appears to be work for
another one or two months. For abstract kernel steps, ∼procs has been shown, and
here also the rest of the proof work is straightforward. Proving CVM primitives to
be correct is tedious work due to the inline assembler portions. Nevertheless, for
three of them we already have formal proofs in Isabelle [27]. Context switching,
i.e. saving a process state to its process control blocks and restoring it, is also fully
formally proven. All together, the CVM speciﬁcation and the associated proofs
comprise currently about 50,000 lines in Isabelle.
8 Summary and Further Work
We have presented a formal model for CVM and have deﬁned the meaning of im-
plementation correctness in this context. The pervasive formal correctness proof
of the CVM implementation—which has been completed to a large extent—yields
a trustworthy framework down to the hardware. Microkernel veriﬁcation can now
focus on verifying an abstract microkernel in a high-level language, avoiding to deal
with tedious low-level argumentation but still with the beneﬁts of pervasive systems
veriﬁcation.
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Future work includes the veriﬁcation of further CVM primitives, especially those
dealing with devices. In particular, accessing devices in block mode, i.e. reading
and writing big chunks with one kernel call, yields major challenges like handling
interrupts that might occur during such accesses.
The new Hypervisor project in Verisoft XT deals with even more open research
problems. Here, a multi-threaded virtualization layer, the hypervisor, runs multi-
threaded on a multi-processor architecture with a weak memory model and is com-
piled using a highly optimizing compiler. Due to the major diﬀerences in design and
complexity of this task, it seems unrealistic to expect anything of CVM to be reused
but the experience and knowledge gained by the people involved in this work.
Yet, the applicability of our approach to smaller kernels has been shown with
Verisoft’s VAMOS. In the new Verisoft XT project, the commercial microkernel
PikeOS [28] is to be veriﬁed on code level; unlike CVM, PikeOS might be interrupted
in system mode, for instance a higher priority process might suspend a lower priority
process’ kernel call. This means that the CVM model has to be extended in order to
deal with multiple kernel stacks. The success of this undertaking would prove, that
the CVM approach is of considerable relevance for the huge market of embedded
systems.
In order to achieve this, several obstacles have to be overcome from our ex-
periences: (i) Code veriﬁcation with an interactive theorem prover—though using
a veriﬁcation environment—is not applicable in a commercial setting due to the
tremendous amounts of time it takes even for highly trained people. So far, au-
tomated tools are only useful for a restricted class of interesting properties. The
degree of automation in software veriﬁcation has to get close to that in hardware
design. (ii) We are using a specially built and veriﬁed compiler in our work. Com-
mercial, highly optimizing compilers are not veriﬁed and won’t be for a couple of
years. Diﬀerent approaches of relating high-level code to object code like translation
validation for optimizing compilers [19] or proof carrying code [18] are promising.
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